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Abstract : In a model of cost-sharing prices, we replace standard con-
tinuity assumptions with monotonicity assumptions. We obtain three
results: equilibria exist; all equilibria are supportable; and
equilibria are sustainable iff they are stable.

I. Introduction
In this note we provide an existence proof for equilibrium relative
to the Aumann-Shapley price system for a model without continuity as-
sumptions on the cost or demand functions. We replace these assumptions
with assumptions that these functions are "downward-sloping". We shall
make some additional assumptions that allow us to write an explicit
formula for the AS prices, but they are not needed for the existence
proof. We shall also show that under the monotonicity assumptions,
every equilibrium is supportable, and that stability of equilibrium is
equivalent to sustainability. This pricing mechanism has been inves-
tigated in a series of recent papers [Mirman-Tauman (MT) , Billera-Heath
(BH) , etc. J which have provided an axiomatic characterisation; the
extension we propose here satisfies the same axioms, and has the addi-
tional properties claimed for this mechanism. The approach used here
is based on the value of nonatomic games, as developed by Aumann-Shapley
(AS). The author wishes to acknowledge helpful discussions with L. Arvan,
L. Mirman, A. Roth, and Y. Tauman. All errors remain the author's.
II. Existence of Equilibrium
The model we shall use is essentially that used by MT, and called
by them Model A. It has the following features:
i) there are no consumers; each consumer j has a consumption
set XJ and a utility function u
,
ii) there is one producer, m outputs and one input, denoted
with subscript 0;
iii) for each consumer, XJ - ["0,xJ J CE , with"? >> 0; uJ
is continuous, quasi-concave and monotone increasing in
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x., i >^ 1, monotone nondecreasing in xp!; consumer j's
initial endowment is < r < x~—it consists of a posi-
tive amount of the input only.
m I i
iv) there is a production set G c E , which defines a cost
function F:E™ * E
+
by F(x) = min y s.t. (y,x) e G.
Definition 1: (y,x) is feasible iff it belongs to G; it is on the
frontier of G if y * F(x).
Definition 2_: F is an admissible cost function [we write F S a] iff:
>d on a rectangular subset LU,qj <- f
n
i) F is define [0 ] C E , where
q ^ x = I x ;
j-l
ii) F is finite on [0",q"j
;
iii) S(F)—the spectrum or set of discontinuities of F—consists
of a finite number of smooth submanifolds of [0,q] of the
form (f ) (0) for some smooth dif feomorphism f ,
1 = JL
,
« « . , K. s % t. •
a) the (f
1
) (0) have disjoint neighborhoods in [0,qj;
b) for all q 6 [0", q] , if L = {fq: t S [0,1]} and
h
X
(q) = (f
i )~1 (0) n L , then #h
X
(q) is finite;
q
c) for all q G [*0 ,q ] , and for all x 6 ^(q) , (f
i )~1 (0)
is transverse to L at x.
q
iv) outside S(F), F is assumed to be of class C except for at
most a finite number of points.
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We adopt the following normalisation convention on the functions
f : if df denotes the gradient of f at x S (f ) (0), then for all
x e l
,
q
df
X
-q - 1
x
We remark that MT have shown that if F G A and S(F) = 0, then the
game defined by F*q belongs to the space of games pNAD.
We are now ready for the definition of AS prices; just as the
prices for the continuous case were defined via the value of a nonatomic
game, we shall define the prices using a "u-value", which will satisfy
the axioms usually given for the value. This price mechanism will agree
with the unique value on spaces such as bv'NA, pNA, and pNAD, but will
not be unique on the space of games generated by A.
Definition 3: let F be admissible and x€ [0,q], The jump at x is:
(1) J(x) = lim F(tx) - lim F(tx)
t+1 t+1
and for any q£ [0, q] , the AS prices for cj_, P (F,q) are given by
K 1
(2) P
3 (F,q) = S Z JCxWf 1 + / df(tq)dt
i=l x hi(q) X
where dF is the gradient of F, defined almost everywhere.
a
For reference purposes, we recapitulate the axioms satisfied by P
,
as stated by MT.
Axiom 1: [ efficiency ] for every F and x,
P
a(F,x)«x = F(x)
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Axiom 2: [ additivity ] if F = G + H,
p
a(F,7) = Pa(G,x) + Pa(H,7)
Axiom 3: [ positivity ] if F is nondecreasing,
P
a(F,x) >
Axiom 4: [ consistency ] if F is defined on [0,q] and there exists a
m
function G defined on [0, E q.] C E with the property that
i=l X
for all x C [0VqJ C E™,T
m
F(x) = G( I x )
i=l
then, for each i and x,
m
p
a (F,x) = Pa (G, Z x )
1 i=l
Axiom 5: [ rescaling ] for any positive m-vector t = ( t ..,..., t) and
x€ [0,qj C E™ define t.(x) = —-. If G is defined on
1
i
[0,t(q)J by G(t(x)) = F(x), then
t(P a (G,t(x))) - Pa (F,x).
It is straightforward to verify that P as defined in (2) satisfies
these axioms, and it can be shown that if we restrict attention to cost
functions which are continuous, for example, or which belong to the
closure (in the variation norm) of the span of separable cost functions
continuous at "0 and "q, that the AS price mechanism, which agrees with
(2) whenever (2) makes sense, is the unique "price mechanism" satis-
fying these axioms. (For a proof of a similar proposition, see Samet-
Tauman (ST).)
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Partially as a consequence of this axiomatic characterisation, we
have the following properties of P .
Property 1: if F e A and x e [0,q], then for each t £ E
,
P
a(tF,x) = tPa (F,x)
Property 2; if F is homogeneous of degree r > 0, then for each x G [0 ,q J
,
P
a(F,x) = - dF
r x
i.e., P is a linear multiple of marginal cost. In fact if F has con-
stant returns to scale, then P = MC.
Property 3: P has certain continuity properties; first, it is con-
tinuous in the variation norm on F: if F F in variation then
n
P
3
(F
n
,x) * P
a (F,x)
providing that F and F are defined on [0,x].
3. n
Moreover, P has some continuity properties in x: suppose that x * x,
and that
lim h^x") - h^x)
then
lim Pa (F,xn ) = P a (F,x)
Property 4_: Let F and G be defined on [0,x] and suppose that some
neighborhood of L . Then
x
P
a (F,x) = P a (G,x)
Definition 4: Let II be a permutation of the set {l,...,m} , and for
every x ^ let II(x) = ( x
nQ) » • • • > x n( m)^ '
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Property 5: Let F 6A and define a cost function n*F on II ([0,qj) by
n*F(x) = F(H(x))
then for each x £ II ([0,q]) and each i
P
a (II*F,x) = Pa . (F,n(x))
1
n
_i (i)
Property 6: let F be independent of commodity i in the sense that for
all x S [0,q J
,
F(x) = F(x
1
,...,x
i_1
,0,xi+1 ,...
,x
ffl
)
then
p
a (F,x) = 0.
l
We shall now define equilibrium in the model.
Definition 5; (p*, (yJ ,x:')
n
=1 ) in E™ x E^ is an equilibrium iff
i) for each j, (jr'.x-1 ) argmax {u-'Cy.x): px _< vH - y} ;
n .
ii) if (y,x) = E (yJ ,xJ ), (y,x) is feasible; and
j-l
iii) p* = P
a (x)
We shall now present the assumptions that let our existence argu-
ment go through.
Definition 6_: Let F be an admissible cost function; we say that F is
semicomplementary iff for all q, q' G [0,q]
(3) q £ q' implies P
3 (F,q) > Pa(F,q')
We say that demand is downward sloping iff there is a selection Q(p)
from the aggregate demand correspondence with the property that
-7-
(4) p< p' implies Q(p) > Q(p')
We can find simple examples of semicomplementary cost functions;
cost functions that are continuous and have nonpositive second deriva-
tives (MT's cost complementarity condition); cost functions which
satisfy cost complementarity where they are continuous and which jump
downwards, etc. Downward sloping demand is usually a somewhat stringent
condition, but is not so restrictive here, since the price of the en-
dowment good is fixed at 1: thus if p > p' the budget set of every
agent at p is strictly contained in the budget set at p'
,
providing
P * P'.
Theorem A: Suppose that the cost function is admissible and semicom-
plementary, and that demand is downward sloping. Then there exists an
equilibrium.
III. Supportability and Sustainability of Equilibria
We shall show that equilibria of the model we are working with are
all supportable, and that stability under a particular adjustment mech-
anism whose fixed points are the equilibria is equivalent to sustain-
ability.
Definition 7: Let (p*,q*) € E x E . We say that (p*,q*) is supportable
iff for all q G [0,q*], we have
(5) p*-q<_F(q)
In other words, no entrant who sells a smaller quantity than the in-
cumbent at the same price can hope to make a profit.
-8-
We say that (p*,q*) is sustainable iff for all p <^ p* and q _< Q(p), we
have
(6) p-q < F(q)
In other words, no entrant can hope to make a profit, if the incumbent
maintains its price.
We remark that it may not be possible for the entrant whose price
equals the incumbent's price in a given market to sell as much as the
demand curve would predict. However, any (p*,q*) that is sustainable
in the sense defined here will also be sustainable in the world where
the incumbent can defend some of its market share, providing it is not
undercut. Moreover, should it be the case that the demand function
(or a selection from it) can be approached continuously from below at
this price, there will be no different between the two criteria.
Now to define the stability concept we are using:
Definition 8: Let p be a price vector and Q a selection from the aggre-
gate demand correspondence.
P°(p) = Pa(Q(p))
Now, suppose that (p*,q*) is an equilibrium; we say that it is stable
from below iff for every p <_ p* , we have
p < P°(p) < p*
Theorem Ek Suppose that the cost function is admissible and semicom-
plementary and that demand is downward sloping. Then every equilibrium
is supportable and an equilibrium (p*,q*) is sustainable iff it is
stable from below.
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IV. Proofs and Comments
We begin by remarking that we have not explicitly ruled out fixed
costs; however, the formula defining P does not make allowance for
them. Since we are not requiring continuity at 0, we can assume that
F(0) = and that F(x) > b > for x j^ 0. As to how to divide the
fixed costs, a reasonable procedure would be to assume that F is dif-
ferentiable in a neighborhood of 0, providing we were to put F(0) = b.
Then b can be divided according to the limit of the derivatives, dF-rr*
In this section we shall verify properties 1-4 and prove proposi-
tions A and B.
Property 1: follows from the definition (2).
Property 2_: Since homogeneity implies continuity, and thus that
dF(tq) = tr-1dF(q)
formula 2 gives
p
a (F,q) = dF(q) / t* ht = ^ dF(q)
Property 3_: In the continuous case, the result follows from the result
obtained for pNAD by MT. The extension to the discontinuous case fol-
lows from admissibility (which guarantees that J(x) is continuous in x
in the sense that
x G (f
1 )" 1 (0), x
n
G (f
1 )~1 (0), x
n
* x imply J( X
n
) + J(x)
and formula (2).
Property 4: If F and G coincide on a neighborhood of L then for allc i. -
q
t s.t. tq <?" S(F) n S(G), we have dF(tq) = dG(tq) and for all t s.t.
tq G S(F) n S(G) we have tq G h^q), and the J(tq) and df 1 coincide.
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Theorem A: The existence and upper semicontinuity of the demand cor-
respondences *? (p) can be easily established by standard techniques.
Let q (p) be selections from these correspondences that are downward
sloping, and denote their sum by Q(p).
Now let us define a map Q°:[0,x] + [0,x] by
(7) Q°(q) = Q(Pa (q))
Consider a map M:L * L on a lattice; it is said to be isotone iff
(8) a < b implies M(a)
_< M(b)
3.
Since the composition of Q and P is isotone, we can apply Tarski's
fixed point theorem * to assert the existence of a fixed point q* for
Q°. The Tarski Theorem says that an isotone map M on a complete
lattice L has a fixed point. A complete lattice is one where every
subset has both a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. In
the case of E , a complete lattice is a rectangular bounded subset,
since the greatest lower bound of a subset S of E, is L(S) where
L (S) = inf x
xeS
and the least upper bound is U(S) where
U.(S) = sup x.
1
xSS 1
The proof of Tarski's theorem is quite simple, so we shall repro-
duce the proof given in Birkhoff. Let S be the set of x £ L s.t.
M(x)
_< x, and a = U(S). Trivially, "0 e S and by hypothesis and iso-
tonicity, for all x S S
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x
_< M(x) < M(a)
so that a = U(S)
_< M(a) , and a € S. By isotonicity, M(a) _< M(M(a)) so
M(a) S S, whence M(a)
_< U(S) = a, therefore a = M(a).
Therefore, we have q* s.t. Q°(q*) = q*; let us denote P (q*) by p*.
We claim that (p*,q (p*)) is an equilibrium. It is obvious that con-
ditions i and Iii are satisfied, so it remains to verify feasibility.
_
n
.
_
n
,
__
_ _
Let w = Z \r
,
q* = Z q^Cp*). and q* = [q*...,q*]. We need to show
j=l 1 j=l
that (w-q*,q*) is on the frontier of G. By efficiency, p*-q* = F(q*),
and for each j , the budget constraint gives us
qj(p*) + P*qj (p*) = ^
so that
q* + p*q* = w
implying p*q* = F(q*) = w - q* as required. Q.E.D.
Theorem B; We first show supportability. Let q <_ q* , where q* is the
aggregate output at an equilibrium (p*,q (p*) ) . , , and suppose
_a contrario
,
that
p*-q > F(q) = P a(q)-q
by efficiency. This gives, using the fact that p* = P (q*), that
[P
a
(q>) - P
a
(q)J-q >
which contradicts semicomplementarity.
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Now suppose that (p*,q*) is stable; for every p <_ p*, we have
(9) p* > P°(p) 2 P
Therefore, by definition of P° we have for each i
(10) p* > P
a
(Q(p)) 2 Pi
and therefore
(11) sup{[p - Pa (Q(p))J-q : < q < Q(p)} <
and by semicomplementarity (monotonicity of P ) that
(12) sup{[p - P3(q)J-q : < q < Q(p)} <
which is precisely sustainability. The converse is obtained by re-
versing the order of the above arguments, since all implications are
equivalences in the above. Q.E.D.
We remark that the fixed points of Q° are the images of fixed points
of P° under the demand map Q: the reason we did not use P° in the proof
of Theorem A is that P° is not defined on a complete lattice.
Footnote
* We are indebted to A. Roth for providing a reference to Tarksi's
Theorem.
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